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Abstract. We celebrate the 20th anniversary of the introduction of the Euro by reviewing one 
of the key elements: the integration of the Eurozone financial markets. Introducing a 
multivariate volatility test based on the asymmetrical BEKK (ABEKK) multivariate GARCH 
model of volatility to analyse the stable market pre-condition hypothesis of the integrated 
Eurozone equity markets across the euro’s timeline. Extending our analysis to the impact of 
the rise of the populist political movement on the Eurozone financial markets during the last 
few years. The first and most important contribution is the introduction of a multivariate 
volatility test based on the ABEKK to analyse the stability of the integration in the Eurozone 
equity markets. However, another key contribution is the analysis of a period where the 
whole concept of European integration is coming into question by the rise of the populist 
political movement. This research could be of importance to the ECB in stabilising the 
Eurozone financial markets as well as market participants in portfolio optimization within 
the Eurozone. Our results point to a difference in financial market integration depending on 
the definition. The empirical evidence found that market participants tend to react 
differently according to the affinity of the market participants to the event/news. In essence, 
market participants are driven by the “time and space” effect. This would point to evidence 
that the Eurozone equity markets was never truly integrated in the econometrics sense as 
defined later on. However, our literature review did identify evidence that the Eurozone 
equity markets was integrated in accordance with the definition of Baele et al., (2004). Hence 
it really does depend on the definition used. Generally, our policy recommendations are for 
a committee to be setup to unify the communication and actions of the European Union 
during crises. A better way of communicating the work and concept of the European Union 
to the population. Finally, a slower paced policy of integration to overcome the sense of loss 
national identity which recently many are plying on. 
Keywords. Euro, European integration, Volatility test, Asymmetric BEKK, Multivariate 
GARCH, Volatility spillover, News contagion, Equity markets. 
JEL. C12, C58, E44, F36, G15. 
 
1. Introduction 
he introduction of the Euro was probably one of the most significant 
financial events of the last century, not only because of the 
introduction of a new currency across the Eurozone but also it 
contains an influencing concept. At its heart lays a strong ideology in order 
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to prevent conflicts between the countries of Europe, like the first and 
second world wars, there is a need to integrate the economies and financial 
markets under one currency and monetary policy. Conversely, on 1st 
January 1999 the euro was first introduced into 11 countries, hence 
integrating 11 diverse economies and financial markets under one common 
monetary union. However, the recent further integration is one of the 
reasons for the fresh increase in the popularity of the populist/nationalist 
political movements, especially in the aftermath of the crises and economic 
downturns, due to the loss of a “national identity” and/or “economic 
constraints”. We introduce a multivariate volatility test using an 
asymmetrical BEKK MGARCH model first proposed by Engle & Kroner 
(1995); analysing the stability of the integrated Eurozone financial markets 
through six different observed periods in the timeline of the euro including 
the recent rise of populist political movements.   
Although, many papers have been written on the impact of the euro on 
the integration of the financial markets across the Eurozone during the 
introductory and crises periods. Moreover, there is an extensive library of 
research on the impact of the euro on the volatility spillover effect and 
contagious impact of news within the Eurozone. Yet a key issue remains 
understudied; the stability of the Eurozone markets which was highlighted 
by the recent financial and sovereign debt crises and extended by the recent 
rise in the populist political movement, such as the Brexit process or rise of 
populist political parties, which puts into question the whole concept of 
European integration. 
As argued by Fakhry (2019), since the volatility test indicates that if a 
market is inefficient then it is deemed to be too volatile to be efficient. 
Simply put, this means that for a market to be efficient the pre-condition is 
a measurable stability status. Thus, meaning that essentially the volatility 
test is a test of the stability pre-condition. In a number of collaborations 
such as Fakhry & Richter (2016, 2018) using the volatility test, found 
diverse evidence of market stability in the Eurozone financial markets 
during the recent global financial and Eurozone sovereign debt crises. 
While Fakhry (2019) analysing the impact of Brexit on the UK’s financial 
markets found that populism politics could destabilize a market.  
Recent studies such as Dotz & Fisher (2011), Metui (2011), Tamakoshi 
(2011) and Mohl & Sondermann (2013) point to a changing behaviour in the 
integrated financial market depending on the general market environment. 
This was confirmed by Fakhry & Richter (2018) who find that the stability 
of the financial markets may vary among markets and depend on the 
general environment. Conversely, as illustrated by Pericoli & Sbracia (2003) 
the evidence on contagion and spillover effects are strong. Furthermore, as 
noted by Pericoli & Sbracia (2003), this evidence is not limited to countries 
within a region but there is also evidence of cross regions volatility 
transmissions. Louzis (2013) also notes the strong evidence of cross markets 
spillover effects during the crises highlighting the volatility transmission 
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between the stock and sovereign debt markets during the Eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis. 
Although as Christiansen (2007) demonstrated that it is possible to 
model volatility spillover effects using an univariate GARCH model. 
Moreover, the VAR as illustrated by Louzis (2013) could be used to identify 
spillover effects using Diebold & Yilmaz (2012) methodology. Furthermore, 
as illustrated by Billio & Pelizzon (2003) and Baele (2005), spillover effects 
can be detected using a multivariate Markov switching model. However, 
Multivariate GARCH models are more flexible and thus often used in the 
study of spillover and contagious effects such as (Missio & Watzka, 2011, 
Favero & Missale, 2011; Groba et al., 2013; MacDonald et al., 2018; Trabelsi 
& Hmida, 2018). 
To this extent, we use an asymmetrical BEKK-MGARCH (aka ABEKK) 
model to analyse the impact of volatility spillover effect and contagious 
impact of news on the Eurozone financial markets since the introduction of 
the euro. We also introduce a multivariate variant of the volatility test to 
analyse the stability of the environment in the Eurozone financial market. 
We restrict our analysis by using the EuroStoxx 50 index as the benchmark 
market, thus meaning we analyse the transmission of volatility and news 
between each observed equity market and the EuroStoxx 50 index. Using 
the equity markets from the 10 original members of the Eurozone2plus 
Greece 3 observed from 31st December 1997 to 31st December 2018. 
Furthermore, we use timeline analysis to research the impact of six 
different periods associated with the pre-euro, introduction of the euro, 
mid-2000s global asset price bubble, recent crises (i.e. global financial and 
Eurozone sovereign debt crises) and rise of populist movement in the last 
few years. 
Our key contribution to the literature on financial econometric is the 
extension of the volatility test of Fakhry & Richter (2016a) to a multivariate 
volatility test using an ABEKK model. This would allow us to test the 
stable market precondition hypothesis, as proposed by Fakhry (2019), in 
the context of a multivariate environment. Therefore, analysing the 
environment underpinning the transmission of volatility and news from 
one market to the other within the Eurozone integrated financial market. 
Although, the ABEKK have been used to analyse the transmission of 
volatility such as (Wang & Wang, 2005; Li, 2007; Efimova & Serletis, 2014; 
Emenike, 2014); yet mainly due to the complex nature of such a model and 
estimation issues, the ABEKK model has been sparingly used in the context 
of the Eurozone financial markets integration.  
Since as hinted by Bekaert et al. (2002) and Baele (2005), a fully 
integrated market displays interdependency and correlated returns 
amongst its segments; thus it is one where news contagion and volatility 
2 As with other researches in the Eurozone, we don’t analyse the Luxemburg financial 
market.  
3 Although Greece did not join until 1st January 2001, yet we feel that Greece is an important 
market mainly due to the sovereign debt crisis. 
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spillover from one segment effects all segments. In general, our results 
suggest that the market participants within the Eurozone subscribe to the 
“time and space” effect meaning they tend to react differently to events 
depending on the time horizon and market. In essence, market participants 
react differently according to their affinity to the event. Thus suggesting the 
Eurozone equity markets was never truly fully integrated.  
Given our findings and the latest views on further integration, we 
recommend a slower pace of integration for the foreseeable future to 
overcome the loss of national identity which gives rise to extreme views. 
We also advise the European parliament to communicate more with the 
population in order to raise awareness of the work and concept of the 
European Union. A key issue raised by the recent crises within the 
Eurozone and the European Union is miscommunication, we recommend 
the setup of a committee to oversee the communication and actions during 
any event.  
We follow the convention by firstly reviewing the literature on the 
Eurozone financial markets integration. Secondly, we review the 
methodology of the model specifications of the ABEKK MGARCH and our 
multivariate volatility test. Thirdly, we review our observed data. The 
fourth section provides our empirical evidence on the stability of the 
Eurozone integrated equity markets, analysing the volatility spillover 
effects and impact of contagious news over six periods during the timeline 
of the euro. Concluding with the conclusions and recommendations. 
 
2. A literature review of the Eurozone’s integrated 
financial markets 
In order to understand the impact of the spillover and contagion effects, 
we need to research the impact of integration on the Eurozone equity 
market. Baele et al., (2004) defines an integrated financial market as a 
market for financial instruments and services where all market participants 
are governed by three principle characteristics: 
1. a single set of rules regarding the purchase or selling of instrument 
or services. 
2. equal access to instruments and services. 
3. equal treatment for all market participants engage in a market. 
As stated by Baele et al., (2004), economic theory dictate that the 
integration and development of financial markets are key to economic 
growth in the Eurozone by removing frictions and barriers and allocating 
capital more efficiently. However, a key issue is taken a step too far 
financial integration could be detrimental to market competition as 
highlighted by Baele et al., (2004). Further, a key argument made by Baele et 
al., (2004) is that financial integration may affect the structure and hence 
have implication for the stability of the financial system. 
According to Cohen (2003) many economists and academics predicted 
the Euro will challenge the dollar for global supremacy, for many at the 
time the question was not if but when. Relatively few, such as Feldstein 
B. Fakhry, JEPE, 6(3), 2019, p.226-256. 
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(1997), questioned the enthusiasm towards the new currency. As quoted by 
Cohen (2003, p.576), many predicted “a rosy future” for the new currency. 
However, according to Cohen (2003) there were four major obstacles 
standing in front of the euro challenging the dollar as the global currency at 
the time: firstly, the persistent inertia behaviour of monetary systems.  
Secondly, the cost of doing business in euros. Thirdly, the “anti-growth” 
bias built into EMU and finally the ambiguous governance structure of the 
EMU. Although as Cohen (2003) states these obstacles could be overcome. 
Conversely, Papaioannou et al., (2006) found that the influence of the Euro 
as the reference international reserve currency of the central banking 
environment was growing and accordingly “Punching above its weight”. 
Ehrmann & Fratzscher (2002) found in the immediate aftermath of the 
introduction of the euro macroeconomic news from the US had more 
impact on the Eurozone financial markets than vice-versa. However, the 
importance of macroeconomic news, especially the M3 monetary levels and 
CPI, from the Eurozone grew in the later stages of the Euro’s introduction 
period.   
Reviewing the impact of the euro on the financial markets after one year, 
Danthine et al., (2000) found evidence illustrating the euro did have an 
immediate impact on the Eurozone financial markets. However, the impact 
was not mainly due to the elimination of currency risk but a result of 
indirect feedback mechanisms. These feedback mechanisms include the 
cross-country transaction costs, liquidity of the Eurozone’s financial 
markets, diversification opportunities available for Eurozone investors and 
institutional changes effecting the banking sector.  
As Trichet (2001) states the euro had a huge impact on the Eurozone’s 
financial markets. Across the board, the Eurozone financial markets grew 
in the aftermath of the introduction of the euro.  A key factor in the equity 
market was the growth in mergers and acquisitions totalling over $1 trillion 
during the initial two years of the euro. An important factor in this is the 
trend towards the merger or cooperation between stock exchanges i.e. the 
Euronext stock exchange which was created by the merger of the exchanges 
in Paris, Brussels and Amsterdam. In the aftermath of the introduction of 
the euro, the total market capitalisation of the Eurozone’s equity market 
stood at €5.5 trillion in 1999 as oppose to €3.6 trillion in 1998. According to 
Trichet (2001). The contributory factors to this growth are not only the rise 
in price but also the IPO of private companies. However, as Trichet (2001) 
states there were still some barriers to further integration of the Eurozone’s 
financial markets; hinting at the Lisbon meeting of the European Council in 
March 2000 as a landmark in the integration of the European financial 
markets.  
Conversely, in a study of the impact of the euro on the European 
financial markets after four years, Galati & Tsatsaronis (2003) noted the 
impact is uneven across the spectrum of the financial market. In many 
respects the euro have had a positive impact i.e. the redirection of prices in 
the equity market to reflect industry risk factors as oppose to country risk 
B. Fakhry, JEPE, 6(3), 2019, p.226-256. 
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factors and lower cross border transaction barriers. These positive impacts 
have enhanced the ability for investors to build pan-European strategies 
and portfolios. However, Galati & Tsatsaronis (2003) found there were still 
issues with implications on financial markets integration; like the focus on 
narrowly defined interests meaning the potential of European Monetary 
Union to integrate financial markets may not be fully realised. Another 
issue highlighted is diverged legal and institutional infrastructures and 
market practices which may impede on further development of the 
Eurozone financial markets. 
According to Fratzscher (2001), European equity markets have become 
increasingly integrated since 1996. This integration is largely driven by 
EMU and is at the heart of the Eurozone’s equity market overtaking the US 
equity market within Europe. Furthermore, Baele et al., (2004) found 
evidence hinting at an increasingly integrated equity market pointing at 
three key elements of the Eurozone financial markets: 
• The advantages of sector diversification have surpassed those of 
country diversification.  
• Equity returns are increasingly determined by common news 
factors. 
• The decrease in home bias within financial institutions’ portfolios. 
Moreover, the results from Hardouvelis et al., (2006) points at 
diminishing forwards interest differentials against the German benchmark 
and inflation differentials have been key to the integration of the equity 
markets during the 1990s. Significantly, the exception was the UK’s equity 
market. Conversely, Lane & Walti (2006) found evidence pointing at strong 
bilateral financial linkages within the Eurozone. However, the results seem 
to suggest that there are other factors than EMU also driving the financial 
integration.   
Nevertheless, Cappiello et al., (2006) found the integration of Eurozone 
equity markets was not as strong as the bond markets and was determined 
by the size of the economy with integration being greater in the large 
economies. And as Bekaert et al., (2013) found that it is EU membership 
rather than euro adoption that have increased financial integration. Thus, 
meaning European equity markets segmentation decreased with EU 
membership.  
An important issue in this paper is the study of the spillover and 
contagion effects on the Eurozone financial market. Much of the empirical 
evidence in the past few years have concentrated on the spillover and 
contagion effect on the Eurozone sovereign debt market during the crises of 
the late 2000s to mid-2010s. Good examples of recent research in spillover 
and contagion effects in the Eurozone sovereign debt markets during the 
crises are Missio & Watzka (2011), Favero & Missale (2011) and Groba et al., 
(2013). Since this paper is partly researching and analysing the volatility 
spillover and news contagion of the Eurozone equity market, therefore we 
will provide empirical evidence on the equity market. 
B. Fakhry, JEPE, 6(3), 2019, p.226-256. 
232 
 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
In essence as stated by Groba et al., (2013), a vital factor in the behaviour 
of volatility in any financial market is the transmission of volatility from 
one asset or market to another; often referred to as the volatility spillover 
effect. The introduction of the VEC by Bollerslev et al., (1988) was aimed at 
the co-movement in the time varying volatility between two or more assets 
or markets. The BEKK introduced by Engle & Kroner (1995) had the 
advantage of the conditional covariance matrices being positive definite by 
construction as stated by Silvennoinen & Terasvirta (2008). However as 
hinted by Silvennoinen & Terasvirta (2008) a major problem is due to the 
number of parameters required in the BEKK; the sheer computing power 
was prohibiting on most computers. This meant convergence using the 
BEKK model was and still is difficult. 
Using a multivariate regime switching model and world and German 
indices as benchmarks markets, Billio & Pelizzon (2003) found volatility 
spillover increased from both benchmarks to most European equity 
markets since the introduction of the Euro. Furthermore, introducing a 
regime-dependent shock spillover intensities variant of the Markov 
switching model, Baele (2005) hints at an increase in intensity in the 
spillover effects for the European Union throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
The key contributory factors are increased trade integration, equity market 
development and low inflation. Moreover, Baele (2005) found some 
evidence of contagion during highly volatile periods.  
Missio & Watzka (2011) use a DCC multivariate GARCH model to 
analyse the contagion effect of sovereign debt credit ratings during the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis in seven Eurozone yield spreads. They use 
the announcements on the Greek credit ratings to analyse the financial 
contagion between the Greek market and the other observed yield spreads. 
The results hint at a strong financial contagion from the credit ratings 
announcement, especially around the first bailout of the Greek economy 
during the summer of 2010. Furthermore, the results imply contagion only 
effect economically or politically unstable countries. Similarly, Groba et al., 
(2013) using the BEKK model on CDS from EU members found a varied 
transmission of risk from the GIPSI4 countries to other EU members during 
the crises period. Like Missio & Watzka (2011), the results hint at a 
fragmentation of the EU between financial distressed members and other 
members. 
Louzis (2013) constructed spillover indices based on Diebold & Yilmaz 
(2012) framework which uses a generalised decomposition of the forecast-
error variance of a VAR model. In general, they found a high level of return 
and volatility spillover effect over the observed markets. Moreover, the 
equity market was the largest transmitter of return and volatility spillover, 
even during the recent sovereign debt crisis. 
MacDonald et al., (2018) using a BEKK model found that the direction 
and intensity of the spillover effect is time dependent. Although the GIPSI 
4 GIPSI are Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland 
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nations are occasionally the largest contributors of the spillover effects, 
however the core Eurozone countries also transmit volatility to the GIPSI. 
Conversely, the results point to the existence of cluster of countries, hence 
the spillover effect comes from within the group ((i.e. Core or Periphery). 
Moreover, Trabelsi & Hmida (2018) using a DCC-MGARCH model and a 
limited number of Eurozone equity markets showed during the recent 
financial crisis there was the existence of contagion between all observed 
markets. However, the results from the sovereign debt crisis points to only 
Greece and Portugal being impacted by contagion.  
 
3. Methodology  
The importance of a stable environment underpinning the Eurozone 
financial markets was underlined during the crises period as illustrated by 
any number of researches during the last few years such as Groba et al., 
(2013), MacDonald et al., (2018) and Trabelsi & Hmida (2018). The impact of 
volatility spillover and contagion of news from one market to the other 
market within the Eurozone is a hot debate that is just as relevant today as 
it was during the crises and euro introductory periods. Therefore, we 
extend the volatility test proposed by Fakhry & Richter (2016a) to a 
multivariate volatility test using an asymmetrical BEKK-MGARCH model 
proposed by Engle & Kroner (1995). We use the 5% critical value F-statistics 
to test the stable market pre-condition hypothesis. As with Fakhry & 
Richter (2016, 2018), we follow the key pre-requisite step advocated by 
Shiller (1979, 1981). 
As illustrated by Shiller (1981), the key factor underlying any volatility 
test is the variance calculation.  We model the datasets in our test as a time 
varying lagged variance of the price using equation 1. We used the 5-
lagged system as advocated by Fakhry & Richter (2016a) 
 lim𝑡𝑡→𝑇𝑇 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑡𝑡� = ∑ �𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃 ,𝑞𝑞−𝜇𝜇𝑃𝑃�2𝑄𝑄𝑞𝑞=1 𝑄𝑄      (1) 
 
However, since we are only concerned with the stability of the 
transmissions of volatility between the markets and thus the integration of 
the Eurozone markets; we don’t follow step 2 of Shiller (1981) estimating 
the residuals using an autoregression model.  
 
3.1. Model specifications for theABEKK bivariate GARCH 
As illustrated by Christiansen (2007) and Ball (2009) among others, a key 
factor in the behaviour of volatility is the influence of volatility from related 
external sources. And while the volatility spillover effect could be 
estimated using a univariate GARCH model as demonstrated by 
Christiansen (2007) thru the use of a three-step technique. Yet we think that 
a more elegant method to our observed data would be to use a multivariate 
GARCH model. There are a number of MGARCH models as surveyed by 
Bauwens et al., (2006) and Silvennoinen & Terasvirta (2008); chief among 
B. Fakhry, JEPE, 6(3), 2019, p.226-256. 
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these models are the BEKK-MGARCH (Engle & Kroner, 1995) and DCC-
MGARCH (Engle, 2002). We use theABEKK model to model the 
conditional covariance of our observed equity market indices. 
One of the key contributions of our research is the use of a bi-variate 
ABEKK model. As hinted previously, we differ from previous research into 
the integration of the Eurozone markets in that we use the EuroStoxx 50 
index as the benchmark equity market. Thus, analysing the spillover and 
contagion effects between the benchmark and observed11 Eurozone 
members in all six stages of the Euro’s timeline. 
The reasoning behind our choice of the ABEKK is the restrictions of the 
other MGARCH models in order to guarantee the positivity of the 
conditional covariance, thus rendering our results unusable. In order to 
overcome these restrictions, we chose to use the unrestricted BEKK model. 
However, the big issue with using any unrestricted BEKK model is the 
large number of parameters and thus computing power required. In a 
normal BEKK, each coefficient matrices have a  𝑁𝑁 × 𝑁𝑁  number of 
parametersplus a C matrix has  𝑁𝑁(𝑁𝑁+1)2  parameters and lastly there are the N 
parameters for the mean equation. However, we are using the more 
complicated ABEKK which adds an asymmetrical matrix, D, with 𝑁𝑁 × 𝑁𝑁 
parameters. With this number of parameters, it is highly likely that one 
reason why the unrestricted ABEKK have been used sparingly in 
econometric research is the sheer computing power it requires. Another 
possible issue with the unrestricted ABEKK is the difficulty to get 
convergence.  
Our single lag ABEKK (1, 1) would be modelled using equations 2 and 3. 
 
Mean Equation  
𝜇𝜇 = 𝜇𝜇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝐸𝐸 + 𝜇𝜇𝑃𝑃          (2) 
 
Covariance Equation 




𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1°𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸<0𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1, 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 = �𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝐸𝐸 ,𝑡𝑡−1𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃,𝑡𝑡−1�′ and 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡−1 = �𝑣𝑣𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝐸𝐸 ,𝑡𝑡−1𝑣𝑣𝑃𝑃,𝑡𝑡−1�′ 
 
𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡  𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−1is the conditional covariance at time t or t-1 
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1is the conditional residuals at time t-1 
C is the constant term  
A is the coefficient matrix of the conditional residuals or ARCH 
B is the coefficient matrix of the conditional covariance or GARCH 
D is the coefficient matrix of the asymmetrical effect 
Since, we are using a bi-variate system to test the transmission of news 
and volatility between the euro index and the other Eurozone indices. The 
generalised matrix system is as in equation 4. 
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𝐶𝐶 =  �𝜔𝜔11 𝜔𝜔120 𝜔𝜔22�, 𝐴𝐴 =  �𝛼𝛼11 𝛼𝛼12𝛼𝛼21 𝛼𝛼22�, 𝐵𝐵 =  �𝛽𝛽11 𝛽𝛽12𝛽𝛽21 𝛽𝛽22�, 𝐷𝐷 =  �𝛾𝛾11 𝛾𝛾12𝛾𝛾21 𝛾𝛾22�  (4) 
 
Therefore, when our model is split into its component parts, we can 
write the components using equations 5-7. 
 
Variance of the Euro equity market benchmark 
 
ℎ1,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶(1,1)2 + 𝐴𝐴(1,1)2𝐸𝐸1,𝑡𝑡−12 + 2𝐴𝐴(1,1)𝐴𝐴(2,1)𝐸𝐸1,𝑡𝑡−1𝐸𝐸2,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐴𝐴(2,1)2𝐸𝐸2,𝑡𝑡−12  
 +𝐵𝐵(1,1)2ℎ1,𝑡𝑡−1 + 2𝐵𝐵(1,1)𝐵𝐵(2,1)𝜎𝜎(1,2),𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝐵(2,1)2ℎ2,𝑡𝑡−1 
 +𝐷𝐷(1,2)2𝑣𝑣1,𝑡𝑡−12 + 2𝐷𝐷(1,1)𝐷𝐷(2,1)𝑣𝑣1,𝑡𝑡−1𝑣𝑣2,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝐷(2,1)2𝑣𝑣2,𝑡𝑡−12  (5) 
 
Variance of the ith Eurozone market 
ℎ2,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶(2,1)2 + 𝐶𝐶(2,2)2 + 𝐴𝐴(1,2)2𝐸𝐸1,𝑡𝑡−12 + 2𝐴𝐴(1,2)𝐴𝐴(2,2)𝐸𝐸1,𝑡𝑡−1𝐸𝐸2,𝑡𝑡−1+ 𝐴𝐴(2,2)2𝐸𝐸2,𝑡𝑡−12  
 +𝐵𝐵(1,2)2ℎ1,𝑡𝑡−1 + 2𝐵𝐵(1,2)𝐵𝐵(2,2)𝜎𝜎(1,2),𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝐵(2,2)2ℎ𝑡𝑡−1 
 +𝐷𝐷(1,2)2𝑣𝑣1,𝑡𝑡−12 + 2𝐷𝐷(1,2)𝐷𝐷(2,2)𝑣𝑣1,𝑡𝑡−1𝑣𝑣2,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝐷(2,2)2𝑣𝑣2,𝑡𝑡−12  (6) 
 
Covariance of the Euro and ith Eurozone equity markets 
 
𝜎𝜎(1,2),𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶(1,1)𝐶𝐶(2,1) 
 
 +𝐴𝐴(1,1)𝐴𝐴(1,2)𝐸𝐸1,𝑡𝑡−12 +
�𝐴𝐴(1,2)𝐴𝐴(2,1) + 𝐴𝐴(1,1)𝐴𝐴(2,2)�𝐸𝐸1,𝑡𝑡−1𝐸𝐸2,𝑡𝑡−1 +𝐴𝐴(2,1)𝐴𝐴(2,2)𝐸𝐸2,𝑡𝑡−12  
 
 +𝐵𝐵(1,1)𝐵𝐵(1,2)ℎ1,𝑡𝑡−1 +
�𝐵𝐵(1,2)𝐵𝐵(2,1) + 𝐵𝐵(1,1)𝐵𝐵(2,2)�𝜎𝜎(1,2),𝑡𝑡−1 +𝐵𝐵(2,1)𝐵𝐵(2,2)ℎ1,𝑡𝑡−1 
 +𝐷𝐷(1,1)𝐷𝐷(1,2)𝑣𝑣1,𝑡𝑡−12 +
�𝐷𝐷(1,2)𝐷𝐷(2,1) + 𝐷𝐷(1,1)𝐷𝐷(2,2)�𝑣𝑣1,𝑡𝑡−1𝑣𝑣2,𝑡𝑡−1 +𝐷𝐷(2,1)𝐷𝐷(2,2)𝑣𝑣2,𝑡𝑡−12       (7) 
 
Under our ABEKK specification, the conditional covariance is estimated 
using equation 3. It is worth noting that the general equation dictates that 
the conditional covariance at time t depends on the conditional covariance 
and the product of the residuals multiplied by the inverse residuals at time 
t-1.However, the key point is the three 𝑁𝑁(𝑁𝑁 + 1) coefficient matrices and 
the raw coefficient matrices. These represent the constant, ARCH and 
GARCH coefficients in the ABEKK.  
Of importance is the matrices A, B and D as highlighted in equation 
4.Since we are only interested in the transmission between two markets, the 
key to the interpretation is the off-diagonal coefficients in all three matrices. 
As intended by Engle & Kroner (1995), the key to interpreting the ABEKK 
lays in the three matrices coefficients: A,B and D. Furthermore, as hinted by 
Engle & Kroner (1995), these coefficients translate into the market shock 
and volatility transmissions from one market to the next. Put simply, as 
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Kim et al. (2015) and MacDonald et al., (2018) states the A matrix coefficient 
reflects the “news contagion effect” and the B matrix coefficient represents 
the “volatility spillover effect”. Thus, meaning that a statistically significant 
value for Α(𝑚𝑚,𝑎𝑎) can be interpreted as the impact of news from market m 
onmarket n. In the same way, a statistically significant value in the Β(𝑚𝑚, 𝑎𝑎) 
coefficient may be interpreted as the volatility spillover between markets m 
and n. As intended by Engle & Kroner (1995), the standard ABEKK implies 
that only the magnitude of the past returns is important in determining the 
current conditional covariance. Hence, we only need to use the magnitude 
of the A and B matrices coefficients to interpret the news and volatility 
spillover effects. Interestingly, the asymmetrical effect, matric D, could be 
interpreted as the impact of news from market m on the volatility of market 
n. In other words, a leverage effect is the transmission of bad news from 
market m to the volatility of market n. Since the leverage effect captures the 
transmission of bad news, it is logical to say that a positive asymmetrical 
effect could be interpreted as the transmission of good news from market m 
to the volatility of market n. 
 
3.2. Specification of the multivariate volatility test 
The coefficients of the ABEKK model of volatility are also key to our 
multivariate volatility test.  It is essential to note that like Fakhry (2019), we 
use our volatility test to analyse whether the market is stable or volatile. As 
mentioned earlier in this section, we derive our stability test by using the f-
statistics; for our observed samples, the f-statistics at the 5% level is 1.96.  
We calculate our stability test statistics using equations 8 and 9 as the 
stability status of the transmission. Since as stated earlier, we are only 
interested in the transmission of volatility from the benchmark euro market 
to market n and vice-versa, thus we only used the off-diagonal matrices. 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝐸𝐸→𝑎𝑎 = �𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝐸𝐸 ,𝑎𝑎  +𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝐸𝐸 ,𝑎𝑎+𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝐸𝐸 ,𝑎𝑎 �−1𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣 �𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝐸𝐸 )�+𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣�𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 (𝑎𝑎)� ≤ 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇  (8) 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝐸𝐸←𝑎𝑎 = �𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎 ,𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝐸𝐸  +𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎 ,𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝐸𝐸 +𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎 ,𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝐸𝐸 �−1𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣 �𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝐸𝐸 )�+𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣�𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 (𝑎𝑎)� ≤ 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃  (9) 
 
Like the univariate volatility test of Fakhry & Richter (2016a), our 
multivariate volatility test consists of three coefficients: A, B, and D 
matrices representing the news contagion, volatility spillover and 
asymmetrical effects. However, since we are analysing a multivariate 
model of volatility, we use a two-factor denominator representing the 
standard deviations of the euro benchmark and Eurozone markets.  
 
4. Data description 
Essentially, this paper analyses the stability of the integrated equity 
markets from the 11 original Eurozone members to establish the impact of 
key periods in the life of the euro on the Eurozone financial markets against 
a Eurozone benchmark market. Hence, we use daily prices from the 11 
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equity markets listed plus the EuroStoxx 50 as the benchmark equity 
market obtained from investing.com. As with the norm, we chose to use a 
five-day week filling the missing data with the last known prices. With the 
exception of the Portuguese PSI 20 index, all the 11 remaining markets 
were observed between 31st December 1997 and 31st December 2018 
meaning a total of 5,479 observations. However, the Portuguese PSI 20 
index was observed from 4th January 1999 making a total of 5,216 
observations. 
 
Table 1.Major Eurozone equity markets Indices 












MIB AEX PSI 20 IBEX 
35 
 
It must be noted that like all indices, the observed equity markets are 
based on weighted ratios of their component’s prices. In common with 
many researches using the volatility test, such as Fakhry & Richter (2018), 
we used a modifier of 25 on the prices to overcome an issue with the 
variance calculations. 
 
5. Empirical evidence 
As hinted earlier, the key variables to our multivariate test of the 
stability in the Eurozone equity markets lay with the coefficients of the co-
variance model and two standard deviation statistics. Essentially, this 
means the model of volatility is the key, we use a bi-variate ABEKK-
MGARCH model. Thus, meaning we analyse the news contagious effect, 
volatility spillover effect and asymmetrical effect by interpreting the A, B 
and D matrices respectively. It is worth noting as stated earlier since we are 
only interested in the transmission effect from one market to the other 
market, we only report the off-diagonal matrices.  
In estimating the models, we used the BFGS estimation method for all 
estimations. However, with the error distribution, we opted to use a 
mixture of normal and t-student distribution models to get the best 
estimation as illustrated by tables2 to 7. For all other options, we used the 
default settings. Crucially, the system environment may influence the 
estimation: our system is running Estima WinRATS Pro (64-bit) 9.20e on a 




During the period immediately before the introduction of the euro, the 
markets were split between enthusiasm and nervousness about the 
introduction of the euro. As hinted by Cohen (2003), relatively few 
questioned the enthusiasm; indeed, many predicted a rosy future. 
5  It is possible to have slightly different estimation results in different environments. 
However, the volatility tests should not be affected. 
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However, the markets were still slightly apprehensive about the 
introduction of the euro as highlighted by Bates (1999) and as stated by 
McCauley & White (1997) there were still many uncertainties surrounding 
EMU. And as Feldstein (1997) hints the fear was that EMU would lead to 
disagreements among the member states as for the right policies for a given 
circumstance. The other key issue during this period was the uncertainty 
bought about by the Russian default and LTCM Crises during the latter 
half of 1998 see (Dungey et al., 2007; Lowenstein, 2000). 
As explained in the methodology, the A matrices pick up the 
transmission of news. Hence a statistically significant 𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝐸𝐸 ,𝑃𝑃  matrix would 
be interpreted as the impact of news from the EuroStoxx on the Eurozone 
equity markets and vice-versa. As illustrated by Table 2, with the exception 
of the ATX and AEX, during the immediate pre-euro period news from the 
EuroStoxx had a significant impact on all the Eurozone markets giving a 
ratio of 8:2. However, news from the Eurozone markets did not have a 
significant impact on the EuroStoxx with the exception of the ATX, CAC 
and AEX intimating a ratio of 3:7. The B matrices indicate the volatility 
spillover effect, hence a statistically significant 𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝐸𝐸 ,𝑃𝑃  would be interpreted 
as the transmission of volatility from the EuroStoxx to the Eurozone 
markets. Table 2 seem to be hinting at six Eurozone markets being affected 
by the transmission of volatility from the EuroStoxx: CAC, DAX, ATHEX, 
ISEQ, MIB and IBEX hinting at a ratio of 6:4. Conversely, the EuroStoxx 
was affected by volatility from four Eurozone markets: AIX, OMXH, ISEQ 
and AEX suggesting a ratio of 4:6. As defined in the methodology, the D 
matrices is the asymmetrical effect; thus, in short indicates whether the 
transmitted news is good or bad. The results from the immediate pre-euro 
period seem to be hinting at a 7:3 transmission of bad news from the 
EuroStoxx to the Eurozone markets (ATX, BEL, CAC, ATHEX, ISEQ, MIB 
and IBEX). Furthermore, there is a 2:8 transmission of bad news from the 
Eurozone markets to the EuroStoxx with only the OMXH and CAC. The 
stability status of the transmission between the EuroStoxx and Eurozone 
markets seem to be hinting at a ratio of 6:4 with four markets being volatile: 
ATX, MIB, AEX and IBEX. Whereas the stability status of the transmission 
from the Eurozone markets to EuroStoxx is hinting at a ratio of 7:3 with the 
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Table 2.Stability Test for Pre-Euro Period (07/01/1998 - 31/12/1998) 
Market i ATX BEL 20 OMX H 25 CAC 40 DAX ATHEX LC ISEQ Overall MIB AEX IBEX 35 
Distribution t-Student Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal t-Student Normal 
Mean Statistics 
µEuro 
8.2772E-02 7.1454E-02 7.5285E-02 8.4374E-02 8.6885E-02 8.2504E-02 9.1931E-02 5.9678E-02 8.7844E-02 7.9791E-02 
(7.551E-03) (1.085E-02) (6.321E-03) (2.944E-05) (8.532E-03) (6.920E-03) (8.534E-03) (5.248E-03) (7.382E-03) (6.495E-03) 
µi 
9.0271E-03 3.8159E-02 1.7895E-02 1.4127E-01 2.5395E-01 4.2959E+00 1.5790E-01 2.7400E+00 2.1924E-03 1.1026E+00 
(1.235E-03) (7.121E-03) (1.365E-03) (6.961E-03) (3.660E-02) (5.211E-01) (1.711E-02) (2.487E-01) (1.656E-04) (7.339E-02) 
Off Diagonal Co-Variance Statistics 
AEuro, i 
7.8386E-03 1.1957E-01 1.0417E-01 3.5509E-01 1.9995E+00 9.8435E+00 3.6564E-01 7.0437E+00 -9.0920E-05 3.6220E+00 
(6.691E-03) (3.438E-02) (1.544E-02) (1.062E-01) (2.845E-01) (2.447E+00) (7.837E-02) (1.307E+00) (4.590E-03) (5.703E-01) 
Ai, Euro 
4.4204E-01 5.7976E-02 -5.3502E-02 1.2466E-01 -2.1521E-03 2.9895E-04 -2.8240E-02 -1.5726E-04 8.8016E+00 1.1438E-02 
(3.532E-01) (7.275E-02) (1.074E-01) (5.568E-02) (3.091E-02) (4.692E-04) (2.454E-02) (1.339E-03) (4.672E+00) (5.165E-03) 
BEuro, i 
7.2789E-03 -1.5334E-02 6.4176E-02 1.0647E-01 -2.4874E+00 -2.1172E+01 -2.1927E-01 2.4303E+00 -3.7133E-03 -3.2495E+00 
(8.114E-03) (5.060E-02) (1.415E-02) (1.880E-01) (3.171E-01) (4.358E+00) (9.152E-02) (1.975E+00) (3.403E-03) (1.039E+00) 
Bi, Euro 
-1.1902E+00 9.1726E-02 -4.1121E-01 -8.3653E-02 -3.3513E-02 -2.5386E-03 1.2321E-01 -1.8348E-04 -1.0063E+01 -4.1190E-02 
(3.986E-01) (9.398E-02) (1.493E-01) (1.280E-01) (4.135E-02) (9.750E-04) (3.076E-02) (2.070E-03) (2.933E+00) (7.338E-03) 
DEuro, i 
 
-1.0000E-08 -4.4191E-02 3.2120E-01 -3.8847E-01 8.6483E-02 -2.1540E-05 -5.4125E-01 -5.2347E+01 2.8721E-02 -1.5695E+01 
(1.385E-01) (2.864E-01) (1.040E-01) (6.874E-01) (3.474E+00) (2.722E+01) (6.648E-01) (2.362E+01) (1.687E-02) (5.170E+00) 
Di, Euro 
7.8000E-07 1.6633E+00 -1.7586E-01 -4.7382E-01 1.0721E-02 3.0000E-08 4.9852E-01 1.5029E-02 5.7256E+01 1.1236E-01 
(1.316E+01) (9.374E-01) (3.860E+00) (1.945E-01) (4.285E-01) (6.368E-03) (2.080E-01) (1.192E-02) (4.408E+01) (2.875E-02) 
Model Statistics 
Log-Likelihood 783.8487 387.0287 592.7830 318.7714 53.5277 -840.8711 2,079.6663 -567.2480 1,341.8880 -336.1376 
Final Criterion 5.60E-06 6.80E-06 4.10E-06 0.00E+00 9.00E-06 8.90E-06 2.70E-06 9.50E-06 4.80E-06 6.70E-06 
Co-integration Volatility Test 
σ2Euro 0.327011          
σ2i 0.045969 0.248090 0.086727 0.448785 1.003011 18.007491 0.709850 8.700593 0.009436 3.918915 
Stability Test (MarketEuro→Marketi) 
Statistics (Euro, i) 2.6406 1.6344 1.2338 1.1948 1.0537 0.6724 1.3453 4.8599 2.8982 3.8442 
Status (Euro, i) Volatile Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable Volatile Volatile Volatile 
Stability Test (MarketEuro←Marketi) 
Statistics (i, Euro) 4.6871 1.4137 3.9653 1.8469 0.7706 0.0547 0.3921 0.1091 163.4568 0.2161 
Status (i, Euro) Volatile Stable Volatile Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable Volatile Stable 
 
5.2. The introduction of the Euro 
As highlighted earlier in the paper, the introduction of the euro bought 
about a phase of improved environment in the Eurozone financial markets 
as illustrated by (Danthine et al., 2000; Trichet, 2001). However, as Galati 
&Tsatsaronis (2003) notes the impact was uneven across the spectrum of 
the Eurozone financial markets. Nevertheless, EMU did have a huge 
impact on the integration of the European financial markets, especially 
within the Eurozone as illustrated by (Fratzscher, 2001; Baele et al., 2004; 
Lane & Walti, 2006). 
On another note, the impact from other events should not be 
overlooked; especially the war on terror which was initiated by the 
September 2001 attacks see (Chen & Siems, 2004; Johnston & Nedelescu, 
2006) and the accountancy issues of 2002 which led to the bankruptcy of 
Enron and WorldCom see (Benston & Hartgraves, 2002; Sidak, 2003; 
Brickey, 2002). 
As illustrated by Table 3, the advent of the Euro reduced the impact of 
news from the EuroStoxx on the Eurozone markets to five markets: DAX, 
ATHEX, ISEQ, PSI and IBEX. However, the impact of news from the 
Eurozone markets on the EuroStoxx did increased to five markets: ATX, 
BEL, OMXH, CAC and AEX. Thus the ratio for both news routes is 5:6. 
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With the exception of the (ATX, BEL, OMXH AEX and PSI), there was 
volatility spillover effect between the EuroStoxx and Eurozone market 
meaning a volatility transmission ratio of 6:5. However, the volatility 
spillover effect from the Eurozone markets to the EuroStoxx was less 
significant with only four markets being affected: ATX, CAC, DAX and 
AEX; giving a ratio of 4:7. 
The results seem to be hinting at the EuroStoxx transmitting bad news to 
six Eurozone markets: BEL, OMXH, CAC, DAX, MIB and AEX; thus 
indicating a ratio of 6:5. Conversely, the transmission of bad news to 
EuroStoxx point to five Eurozone markets: BEL, DAX, ATHEX, AEX and 
IBEX giving a ratio of 5:6. 
The stability status of the transmission between the EuroStoxx and 
Eurozone markets seem to be hinting at a ratio of 8:3 with three markets 
being volatile: ATX, CAC and AEX. Whereas the stability status of the 
transmission from the Eurozone markets to EuroStoxx is hinting at a ratio 
of 9:2 with only the ATX and AEX being volatile. 
 
Table 3. Stability Test for Euro Introductory Period (01/01/1999 - 11/03/2003) 
Market ATX BEL 20 OMX H 25 CAC 40 DAX ATHEX LC ISEQ 
Overall 
MIB AEX PSI 20 IBEX 35 
Distribution Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal GED t-Student Normal 
Mean Statistics 
µEuro 
1.8252E-01 1.4888E-01 1.4110E-01 1.5519E-01 1.5313E-01 1.8019E-01 1.6551E-01 1.3417E-01 1.3906E-01 1.5414E-01 1.5393E-01 
(7.867E-03) (6.998E-03) (7.656E-03) (7.554E-03) (4.139E-03) (9.692E-03) (6.451E-03) (6.953E-03) (6.565E-03) (5.883E-03) (7.585E-03) 
µi 
4.6904E-03 2.6802E-02 1.3354E-02 2.1369E-01 3.5177E-01 1.1734E+00 1.1992E-01 1.4151E+00 2.2808E-03 2.9903E-01 7.5780E-01 
(2.440E-06) (2.350E-03) (1.396E-03) (1.139E-02) (6.991E-04) (7.584E-02) (9.560E-05) (9.810E-02) (1.298E-04) (1.655E-02) (3.360E-02) 
Off Diagonal Co-Variance Statistics 
AEuro, i 
4.7540E-03 1.8235E-02 -5.3600E-03 -8.5587E-02 4.6463E-01 3.3138E-01 1.8626E-01 8.1012E-02 2.5535E-03 2.2861E-01 1.7249E-01 
(5.859E-04) (6.076E-03) (3.339E-03) (8.764E-02) (8.680E-02) (1.975E-01) (2.020E-02) (3.579E-01) (5.108E-04) (5.895E-02) (1.279E-01) 
Ai, Euro 
2.0066E+00 5.2074E-01 3.5355E-01 1.4034E-01 3.0446E-02 4.2181E-04 4.6515E-02 1.8756E-02 6.0038E+00 1.7293E-02 2.9867E-02 
(4.803E-01) (6.693E-02) (3.447E-02) (3.868E-02) (1.477E-02) (2.306E-04) (1.342E-02) (2.958E-03) (2.288E+00) (4.728E-03) (5.768E-03) 
BEuro, i 
-4.6450E-03 -9.2278E-04 1.3913E-02 -9.1728E-01 4.8271E-01 -3.5863E-01 -1.2253E-01 1.8753E+00 1.8722E-03 -9.2672E-03 -1.5536E+00 
(1.178E-03) (8.106E-03) (4.359E-03) (1.292E-01) (1.078E-01) (3.531E-01) (5.028E-02) (7.457E-01) (6.672E-04) (6.524E-02) (2.651E-01) 
Bi, Euro 
2.7084E+00 5.0942E-02 -9.3450E-02 2.6438E-01 -1.0712E-01 2.7433E-04 4.7274E-02 -2.3768E-03 -3.6474E+01 8.8741E-03 9.8045E-03 
(7.156E-01) (7.082E-02) (3.050E-02) (5.818E-02) (3.467E-02) (2.337E-04) (2.595E-02) (4.772E-03) (2.438E+00) (6.050E-03) (8.634E-03) 
DEuro, i 
2.6443E-02 -5.8937E-05 -5.0000E-09 -4.7228E-01 -1.1603E+00 1.1339E+01 1.2842E+00 -5.1636E+00 -3.1791E-03 1.9384E+00 6.1840E+00 
(6.750E-03) (3.144E-01) (6.113E-02) (6.798E-01) (7.285E-01) (2.628E+00) (1.628E-01) (3.550E+00) (3.604E-03) (9.347E-01) (9.942E-01) 
Di, Euro 
3.1656E+01 -1.5430E-03 1.2500E-07 1.2236E-01 -2.2348E-02 -7.0240E-02 3.5434E-01 2.4081E-03 -5.1675E+01 3.2060E-01 -6.1823E-02 
(5.756E+00) (8.231E+00) (1.534E+00) (2.386E-01) (1.455E-01) (2.399E-02) (2.623E-01) (2.070E-02) (1.432E+01) (2.116E-01) (5.292E-02) 
Model Statistics 
Log-Likelihood  3,587.0507 1,144.9582 1,202.1530 492.5994 -320.1671 -3,933.0375 -55.2916 -2,299.9445 5,302.0649 -965.6877 -1,485.9866 
Final Criterion 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.00E-07 2.90E-06 0.00E+00 7.20E-06 0.00E+00 1.80E-06 8.00E-06 1.70E-06 3.10E-06 
Co-integration Volatility Test 
σ2Euro 0.406660           
σ2Market 0.015024 0.218365 0.340313 0.642757 0.861218 33.759090 0.585550 5.335929 0.007623 2.250696 2.319631 
Stability Test (MarketEuro→Marketi) 
Statistics 2.3085 1.5723 1.3273 2.3586 0.9567 0.3018 0.3506 0.7326 2.4108 0.4357 1.3949 
 Status Volatile Stable Stable Volatile Stable Stable Stable Stable Volatile Stable Stable 
Stability Test (MarketEuro←Marketi) 
Statistics 83.8807 0.6877 0.9905 0.4507 0.8668 0.0313 0.5562 0.1709 200.6969 0.2458 0.3749 
Status Volatile Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable Volatile Stable Stable 
Note: PSI 20 start 11/01/1999 
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5.3. Mid 2000s Global bull market  
In accordance with Pagan & Sossounov (2003), we set a trend to be a 
financial market period of four or more month. Thus, allowing us to 
identify the mid-2000s global bull equity market to be between March 2003 
and October 2007 using the monthly MCSI World index obtained from 
investing.com. Furthermore, this observation seems to match the trend in 
the monthly EuroStoxx 50 index as illustrated by Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1.Trends in Global and Eurozone Equities Markets 
 
However, another key factor shaping the financial markets in the mid-
2000s was the housing bubble primarily in the US which started in 2002 
according to Baker (2008). This led to the increase in Mortgage Backed 
Securities and Collateralized Debt Obligationas hinted by Masood (2009). 
As hinted by Fender & Kiff (2004), these securities were by their nature 
complicated to understand and rate. Furthermore, according to Masood 
(2009), these securities included subprime mortgages which offered a high 
positive spread with respect to the yields offered by most governments’ 
bonds mainly due to the inherent high risks. 
In addition, as highlighted previously, the continuation of “war on 
terror” was a key issue with the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq as 
illustrated by (Johnston & Nedelescu, 2006; Fernandez, 2008).  
During the mid-2000s global bull market, news from the EuroStoxx 
impacted only three Eurozone markets: CAC, ATHEX and IBEX as noted 
by Table 4. Furthermore, news from only four Eurozone markets had an 
impact on the EuroStoxx: ATX, BEL, OMXH and AEX. Therefore giving 
ratios 3:8 and 4:7 respectively. 
With the exception of the (ATX, OMXH AEX and PSI), there was 
volatility spillover effect between the EuroStoxx and Eurozone markets 
indicating a ratio of 7:4. However, there was a volatility spillover effect 
from five Eurozone markets to the EuroStoxx: BEL, OMXH, CAC, ISEQ and 
AEX. This would hint at a ratio of 5:6. 
The results seem to be hinting at the EuroStoxx transmitting bad news to 
three Eurozone markets: OMXH, AEX and IBEX. Conversely, the 
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OMXH, DAX, PSI and IBEX. Moreover hinting at ratios of 3:8 and 4:7 
respectively.  
The stability status of the transmission between the EuroStoxx and 
Eurozone markets seem to be hinting at a ratio of 6:5 with five markets 
being volatile: BEL, OMXH, DAX, AEX and IBEX. Yet, the stability status of 
the transmission from the Eurozone markets to EuroStoxx is hinting at a 
ratio of 5:6 with the ATX, OMXH, CAC, DAX, AEX and PSI being volatile. 
 
Table 4.Stability Test for Mid-2000s Global Bull Market Period (12/03/2003 - 
07/06/2007) 
Market ATX BEL 20 OMX H 25 CAC 40 DAX ATHEX LC ISEQ Overall MIB AEX PSI 20 IBEX 35 
Distribution Normal Normal Normal t-Student Normal Normal Normal t-Student t-Student Normal t-Student 
Mean Statistics 
µEuro 
2.8179E-02 2.5382E-02 2.5183E-02 2.5341E-02 2.4339E-02 3.1600E-02 3.9000E-02 1.7084E-02 2.3764E-02 3.6367E-02 2.4057E-02 
(1.699E-03) (1.410E-03) (1.536E-03) (1.057E-03) (1.400E-03) (1.954E-03) (1.733E-03) (8.304E-04) (9.356E-04) (1.651E-03) (1.046E-03) 
µi 
8.7332E-03 1.0806E-02 7.9069E-03 4.4584E-02 6.4174E-02 9.7231E-01 8.1666E-02 1.0390E+00 3.6375E-04 4.5643E-02 1.7456E-01 
(6.749E-04) (4.482E-05) (5.228E-04) (1.823E-03) (3.484E-03) (8.125E-02) (3.580E-03) (5.560E-02) (1.396E-05) (3.409E-03) (7.162E-03) 
Off Diagonal Co-Variance Statistics 
AEuro, i 
8.4322E-03 7.1397E-02 2.4996E-03 1.3745E-01 8.3948E-02 1.2917E+00 6.2738E-03 -3.7205E-04 2.2310E-03 1.0155E-02 3.8146E-01 
(4.068E-03) (2.509E-02) (7.366E-03) (1.593E-01) (9.174E-02) (5.074E-01) (4.511E-02) (8.567E-01) (8.160E-04) (3.699E-02) (2.694E-01) 
Ai, Euro 
1.6481E-01 3.9793E-01 3.4202E-01 6.5284E-02 6.1610E-02 2.9739E-03 -7.8290E-03 -1.0430E-05 4.7370E+00 2.4023E-02 -1.1681E-03 
(1.417E-02) (4.434E-02) (4.564E-02) (5.524E-02) (1.463E-02) (4.129E-04) (4.685E-03) (3.940E-06) (2.512E+00) (5.122E-03) (2.718E-03) 
BEuro, i 
4.0547E-03 -2.8218E-01 -6.1637E-02 5.6985E-01 -2.0216E-01 6.5935E-01 -2.4951E-01 -3.7671E-01 -1.5034E-03 2.6707E-02 -5.5080E-01 
(4.930E-03) (5.596E-02) (7.153E-03) (1.688E-01) (1.428E-01) (6.011E-01) (6.414E-02) (3.408E-01) (1.391E-03) (3.377E-02) (3.018E-01) 
Bi, Euro 
5.0791E-02 4.9401E-01 2.3582E-01 -2.2975E-01 -1.4657E-02 -8.4500E-06 1.2306E-01 -6.3000E-07 7.4661E+00 7.1277E-03 8.7832E-03 
(1.209E-02) (1.209E-01) (5.493E-02) (6.086E-02) (2.810E-02) (4.258E-04) (4.675E-03) (1.680E-06) (4.293E+00) (4.590E-03) (4.031E-03) 
DEuro, i 
7.6479E-01 3.4302E-01 -2.0205E-02 9.4788E-01 1.3840E-06 8.4700E-06 1.6924E+00 9.4636E+01 -6.5039E-03 3.2132E-02 -4.8602E+00 
(1.027E-01) (2.086E-01) (1.566E-01) (1.051E+00) (9.515E-01) (1.140E+01) (3.758E-01) (6.180E+01) (1.148E-02) (4.763E-01) (5.422E+00) 
Di, Euro 
4.7651E+00 5.2221E-01 -1.5219E+00 2.5993E-01 -2.4000E-08 0.0000E+00 1.9882E-01 1.1085E-02 6.7994E+00 -3.8397E-01 -1.5832E-02 
(9.462E-01) (8.853E-01) (1.027E+00) (3.249E-01) (1.676E-01) (8.738E-03) (8.170E-02) (1.277E-02) (3.035E+01) (2.041E-01) (4.284E-02) 
Model Statistics 
Log-Likelihood 3,430.6909 3,971.7453 4,429.3204 4,379.5326 3,220.4664 -948.3656 1,743.7585 -403.4603 9,147.5749 1,824.7063 1,958.1198 
Final Criterion 6.00E-07 9.10E-06 6.40E-06 8.50E-06 2.90E-06 3.20E-06 4.10E-06 3.70E-06 7.00E-07 2.10E-06 1.30E-06 
Co-integration Volatility Test 
σ2Euro 0.125478           
σ2Market 0.254822 0.129432 0.069595 0.226895 0.295208 6.676128 0.688531 377.490365 0.002580 0.515531 1.147335 
Stability Test (MarketEuro→Marketi) 
Statistics 0.5856 3.4042 5.5330 1.8593 2.6581 0.1398 0.5518 0.2470 7.8541 1.4524 4.7372 
Status Stable Volatile Volatile Stable Volatile Stable Stable Stable Volatile Stable Volatile 
Stability Test (MarketEuro←Marketi) 
Statistics 10.4671 1.6247 9.9658 2.5670 2.2655 0.1466 0.8427 0.0026 140.5812 2.1104 0.7921 
Status Volatile Stable Volatile Volatile Volatile Stable Stable Stable Volatile Volatile Stable 
 
5.4. Global financial crises 
The global financial crisis started with the subprime mortgages in the US 
and quickly enveloped the global financial sector. By mid-2007, a number 
of international banks (e.g. Bear Stearns and BNP Paribas) recorded losses 
on their off-balance sheet activities associated with the MBS or CDO 
securities, which resulted in flights to liquidity and quality. This quickly 
enveloped the global financial sector including many European banks such 
as Credit Agricole and Deutsche Bank. As the global financial crisis spread, 
the credit market froze therefore corporations could not find the money 
required and hence the crisis spread to the equity and corporate bonds 
market. For further in-depth research and analysis on the crises see 
(Brunnermeier, 2009; Caballero & Krishnamurthy, 2009; Masood, 2009) 
amongst others. Conversely, it is important to analyse the equity market 
during the global financial crisis. A by-product of such a global financial 
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crisis is the inevitable deep recession which for the Eurozone was between 
2008 Q1 and 2009 Q2, however some countries in the Eurozone were 
affected more than others i.e. the GIPS nations. 
During the global financial crisis, with the exceptions of three markets 
(BEL, ISEQ and AEX); news from EuroStoxx impacted the Eurozone 
markets as Table 5 points. Yet, news from only two Eurozone markets had 
an impact on the EuroStoxx: BEL and AEX. Hence indicating ratios of 8:3 
and 2:9 respectively. 
With the exception of the (DAX and AEX), there was volatility spillover 
effect between the EuroStoxx and Eurozone markets indicating a ratio of 
9:2. However, there was a volatility spillover effect from four Eurozone 
markets to the EuroStoxx: BEL, OMXH, CAC and AEX. Therefore giving a 
ratio of 4:7. 
The results seem to be hinting at the EuroStoxx transmitting bad news to 
two Eurozone markets: OMXH and ATHEX meaning a ratio of 2:9. 
Conversely, the transmission of bad news to EuroStoxx point to four 
Eurozone markets: BEL, DAX, ISEQ and PSI hinting at a 4:7 ratio. 
 
Table 5. Stability Test for Global Financial Crises Period (08/06/2007 - 05/11/2009) 
Market ATX BEL 20 OMX H 25 CAC 40 DAX ATHEX LC ISEQ Overall MIB AEX PSI 20 IBEX 35 
Distribution Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal GED t-Student Normal t-Student 
Mean Statistics 
µEuro 
1.0306E-01 9.3310E-02 1.1560E-01 9.2224E-02 9.9391E-02 1.1885E-01 9.1467E-02 7.9555E-02 8.2856E-02 1.1402E-01 8.3285E-02 
(1.051E-02) (6.749E-03) (6.117E-03) (7.933E-03) (1.209E-04) (6.056E-03) (6.809E-03) (7.591E-03) (4.614E-03) (5.490E-03) (4.383E-03) 
µi 
1.3520E-01 4.5951E-02 8.1944E-02 1.6728E-01 3.8709E-01 4.0273E+00 1.2301E-01 6.3790E+00 9.1593E-04 4.2448E-01 1.1301E+00 
(1.640E-02) (5.042E-03) (4.351E-03) (1.306E-02) (8.073E-03) (7.344E-03) (1.263E-02) (4.612E-01) (4.941E-05) (2.449E-02) (6.337E-02) 
Off Diagonal Co-Variance Statistics 
AEuro, i 
1.6405E-01 -2.6559E-02 1.2682E-01 1.4315E-01 4.8452E-01 3.5128E+00 6.2091E-02 6.0859E+00 1.0901E-04 1.0367E-01 1.4484E+00 
(6.181E-02) (3.285E-02) (2.691E-02) (1.979E-01) (6.311E-02) (1.102E+00) (9.051E-02) (5.146E+00) (9.727E-04) (2.140E-01) (7.615E-01) 
Ai, Euro 
7.6418E-02 2.0537E-01 -3.3607E-02 6.7159E-02 1.1676E-02 2.2338E-03 2.5186E-02 1.9633E-03 9.6908E+00 1.9035E-02 1.0073E-02 
(2.577E-02) (3.590E-02) (6.888E-02) (5.052E-02) (6.375E-03) (5.879E-04) (4.321E-03) (8.036E-04) (2.848E+00) (4.017E-03) (4.660E-03) 
BEuro, i 
1.9014E-01 3.6701E-01 -1.5753E-01 -2.5126E+00 -3.3933E-02 1.4576E+00 2.2907E-01 -2.8125E+01 1.6861E-03 2.2507E+00 -2.2166E+00 
(3.335E-01) (6.256E-02) (2.863E-02) (1.846E-01) (3.272E-01) (1.561E+00) (1.152E-01) (7.401E+00) (9.355E-04) (3.333E-01) (9.632E-01) 
Bi, Euro 
-9.9805E-02 -3.3214E-01 2.5727E-01 6.5892E-01 -7.3459E-02 -1.7825E-03 -4.1211E-03 8.0086E-03 -5.4876E-01 -4.0419E-02 1.7872E-02 
(1.200E-01) (4.762E-02) (9.630E-02) (6.167E-02) (1.806E-02) (8.737E-04) (3.599E-03) (7.816E-04) (3.406E+00) (4.894E-03) (6.184E-03) 
DEuro, i 
4.2000E-08 4.3180E-01 -3.4880E-01 6.1678E-01 9.6932E-01 -3.6223E+01 2.2373E+00 2.9644E+01 1.7578E-02 1.6400E-07 1.0852E+01 
(3.133E-01) (2.684E-01) (2.116E-01) (6.747E-01) (1.293E+00) (8.189E+00) (9.615E-01) (3.359E+01) (6.357E-03) (1.115E+00) (5.358E+00) 
Di, Euro 
5.6000E-07 -3.2998E-02 1.4771E+00 1.4696E-01 -3.4274E-01 2.0133E-02 -7.5545E-01 2.9785E-03 2.0524E+01 -1.1000E-08 6.8087E-02 
(2.595E-01) (5.810E-01) (2.993E-01) (2.590E-01) (7.854E-02) (6.933E-03) (2.929E-01) (4.941E-03) (7.114E+01) (1.003E-01) (2.485E-02) 
Model Statistics 
Log-Likelihood  300.6691 742.1833 931.2756 798.1102 264.2771 -1,865.7951 -377.1802 -1,786.5661 3,652.2827 -591.0954 -621.9875 
Final Criterion 4.10E-06 8.90E-06 8.60E-06 2.30E-06 0.00E+00 3.70E-06 2.80E-06 9.00E-06 3.30E-06 3.00E-06 0.00E+00 
Co-integration Volatility Test 
σ2Euro 0.452223           
σ2Market 0.630372 0.419485 0.190188 0.744926 1.633878 17.450001 1.692385 29.480684 0.006635 3.083772 6.090440 
Stability Test (MarketEuro→Marketi) 
Statistics 0.5965 0.2613 2.1474 2.2993 0.2013 1.8016 0.7127 0.2207 2.1371 0.3830 1.3884 
 Status Stable Stable Volatile Volatile Stable Stable Stable Stable Volatile Stable Stable 
Stability Test (MarketEuro←Marketi) 
Statistics 0.9453 1.3305 1.0909 0.1061 0.6733 0.0547 0.8087 0.0330 62.4718 0.2889 0.1382 
Status Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable Volatile Stable Stable 
 
The stability status of the transmission between the EuroStoxx and 
Eurozone markets seem to be hinting at a ratio of 8:3 with three markets 
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being volatile: OMXH, CAC and AEX, Conversely, the stability status of 
the transmission from the Eurozone markets to EuroStoxx is hinting at a 
ratio of 10:1 with only the AEX being volatile. 
 
5.5. Sovereign debt crisis 
The sovereign debt crisis started with the Greek revision of the deficit 
statistics on 5th November 2009, gradually becoming a wide spread issue of 
confident in global fiscal policies enveloping a number of Eurozone nations 
especially the GIPS nations as illustrated by (Schwarcz, 2011; Metiu, 2011; 
Mohl & Sondermann, 2013). The crisis reached the US with the deficit/debt 
ceiling crises which closed the US federal government, see (Aye et al., 2016; 
Nippani & Smith, 2014). The impact from the sovereign debt crisis led to a 
double dip recession in the Eurozone from 2011 Q3 to 2013 Q1, although 
for some Eurozone countries this was just a continuation of the recession 
that followed the global financial crisis.  
During the sovereign debt crisis, news from EuroStoxx impacted eight 
Eurozone markets; with the exception of the BEL, ISEQ and AEX, every 
Eurozone market was affected as hinted by Table 6. Yet, news from only 
two Eurozone markets had an impact on the EuroStoxx: BEL and AEX.  
Surprisingly, the news transmission did not involve the GIPS markets. 
However, the ratios do tell a varied story with 8:3 and 2:9 respectively. 
With the exception of the AEX and PSI, there was volatility spillover 
effect between the EuroStoxx and Eurozone markets indicating a ratio of 
9:2. However, there was a volatility spillover effect from five Eurozone 
markets to the EuroStoxx: ATX, BEL, OMXH, CAC and AEX. Thus 
meaning a ratio of 5:6. 
The results seem to be hinting at the EuroStoxx transmitting bad news to 
five Eurozone markets: ATX, OMXH, CAC, ISEQ and PSI. Conversely, 
there was transmission of bad news to EuroStoxx from the OMXH, CAC, 
DAX and ATHEX markets. This seem to be indicating ratios of 5:6 and 4:7 
respectively. 
The stability status of the transmission between the EuroStoxx and 
Eurozone markets seem to be hinting at a ratio of 3:8 with eight markets 
being volatile: ATX, BEL, OMXH, CAC, ISEQ, AEX, PSI and IBEX. 
Conversely, the stability status of the transmission from the Eurozone 
markets to EuroStoxx is hinting at a ratio of 8:3 with the OMXH, CAC and 
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Table 6. Stability Test for Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crises Period (06/11/2009 - 
23/05/2014) 
Market ATX BEL 20 OMX H 25 CAC 40 DAX ATHEX LC ISEQ Overall MIB AEX PSI 20 IBEX 35 
Distribution Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal 
Mean Statistics 
µEuro 
4.2214E-02 4.3411E-02 4.4181E-02 4.0793E-02 3.7419E-02 4.5479E-02 4.6584E-02 3.8975E-02 3.8686E-02 4.4333E-02 4.4682E-02 
(7.597E-05) (1.916E-03) (2.037E-03) (1.758E-03) (1.746E-03) (2.039E-03) (2.130E-03) (1.764E-03) (1.848E-03) (2.000E-03) (1.820E-03) 
µi 
4.1706E-02 2.6321E-02 3.8216E-02 7.5143E-02 2.3663E-01 3.4170E-01 5.7336E-02 2.5418E+00 4.1851E-04 1.6396E-01 6.3992E-01 
(1.538E-03) (1.307E-03) (1.789E-03) (3.302E-03) (1.213E-02) (1.689E-02) (2.833E-03) (1.091E-01) (2.246E-05) (1.215E-02) (2.675E-02) 
Off Diagonal Co-Variance Statistics 
AEuro, i 
1.0900E-01 3.6479E-02 1.0474E-01 2.0161E-01 5.2311E-01 7.8490E-01 7.2979E-02 1.3068E+00 1.1437E-03 6.7880E-01 -9.5931E-01 
(2.443E-02) (2.921E-02) (2.035E-02) (1.406E-01) (1.469E-01) (1.349E-01) (2.385E-02) (2.028E+00) (3.746E-04) (1.158E-01) (5.145E-01) 
Ai, Euro 
9.8249E-02 1.8070E-01 7.9670E-02 9.1798E-02 1.0966E-03 2.2790E-03 4.8118E-02 3.1065E-03 7.7313E+00 2.7663E-02 1.2245E-02 
(2.704E-02) (5.300E-02) (2.756E-02) (4.066E-02) (4.932E-03) (6.294E-04) (1.413E-02) (4.503E-04) (3.281E+00) (2.945E-03) (1.613E-03) 
BEuro, i 
-2.7845E-01 -2.3045E-01 -2.5995E-01 -5.7131E-01 -1.5299E-01 -8.0178E-01 -2.2053E-01 -1.6886E+01 -3.1681E-04 5.0368E-02 1.1253E+01 
(4.339E-02) (6.853E-02) (2.800E-02) (2.026E-01) (1.541E-01) (1.934E-01) (3.398E-02) (5.171E+00) (6.616E-04) (1.721E-01) (8.378E-01) 
Bi, Euro 
2.0417E-01 4.8208E-01 -1.3146E-01 -1.5341E-01 9.0305E-03 1.5469E-03 2.0764E-02 2.2508E-03 1.3918E+01 7.4351E-03 -2.4606E-02 
(4.275E-02) (1.589E-01) (0.000E+00) (6.510E-02) (4.775E-03) (6.042E-04) (2.060E-02) (1.467E-03) (4.377E+00) (3.696E-03) (2.920E-03) 
DEuro, i 
-2.8138E-01 7.3576E-02 -1.6930E-06 -5.1480E-06 2.1350E-06 2.1350E-06 -1.7266E-01 2.5327E+01 0.0000E+00 -3.9973E+00 3.9239E-01 
(2.450E-01) (1.813E-01) (1.607E-01) (7.397E-01) (1.151E+00) (1.151E+00) (2.825E-01) (1.449E+01) (2.811E-03) (1.175E+00) (1.983E+01) 
Di, Euro 
1.0298E+00 5.0410E-01 -2.9590E-06 -3.4610E-05 -1.1000E-07 -1.1000E-07 5.0595E-01 1.5599E-02 2.9000E-07 1.1728E-02 1.5643E-03 
(1.603E-01) (6.086E-01) (2.612E-01) (3.537E-01) (3.188E-02) (3.188E-02) (1.979E-01) (3.061E-03) (2.944E+01) (6.312E-02) (8.010E-02) 
Model Statistics 
Log-Likelihood  3,260.4049 4,034.0831 3,431.8634 3,571.6650 1,365.2570 -349.4377 2,686.5624 -1,375.5705 8,904.9819 764.7998 109.0727 
Final Criterion 1.60E-06 1.70E-06 2.00E-06 0.00E+00 9.00E-07 5.10E-06 6.70E-06 4.60E-06 1.20E-06 7.20E-06 6.90E-06 
Co-integration Volatility Test 
σ2Euro 0.162061           
σ2Market 0.173969 0.111005 0.120255 0.296825 1.044217 4.723441 0.203134 10.875993 0.001786 1.179788 3.082813 
Stability Test (MarketEuro→Marketi) 
Statistics 4.3176 4.1030 4.0919 2.9848 0.5222 0.2081 3.6151 0.7926 6.0982 3.1808 2.9849 
 Status Volatile Volatile Volatile Volatile Stable Stable Volatile Stable Volatile Volatile Volatile 
Stability Test (MarketEuro←Marketi) 
Statistics 0.9885 0.6112 3.7256 2.3135 0.8206 0.2039 1.1642 0.0887 126.0313 0.7103 0.3115 
Status Stable Stable Volatile Volatile Stable Stable Stable Stable Volatile Stable Stable 
 
5.6. Rise of populist movement 
A key issue facing any further integration of the Eurozone is the rise of 
the populist right-wing movement. As hinted by Weyland (2001), 
traditionally populism has been defined as a cumulative concept, 
characterized by the simultaneous presence of political, economic, social, 
and discursive attributes. However, as hinted by a number of articles 
including (Mudde, 2004; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013; Jansen, 2011) 
populism is difficult to define. Indeed, as with any ism word it is hard to 
conceptualised as stated by Jansen (2011) leading to Mudde (2004, p.542) to 
state the following” Definingthe Undefinable”.  Many authors have used 
different definition depending on their writings. Mudde (2004) defines 
populism as  
“an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two 
homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the 
corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression 
of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.” 
Whichever definition you used, the rise of the populist movement is 
seen as a threat to the further integration of the EU and Eurozone 
economies and financial markets as hinted by Polyakova & Fligstein (2016), 
Fligstein et al., (2012), Guiso et al., (2018) and Luo (2017). The underlying 
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influences of the Brexit results and prospective Italexit have been attributed 
to the populist movement in both the UK and Italy caused by deep issues 
as illustrated by (Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Hobolt, 2016; Codogno & Galli, 
2017). In particular as the Franco-German axis is the driving force behind 
European integration, the rise in popularity and strength of National Rally 
(an anti-Integration party) in France would be seen as a weakness in the 
future push to further integration. And as put by Luo (2017, p.407) “The 
growth of Eurosceptism in major EU members thus has resulted in political 
instability to European integration.” Moreover, as implied by Luo (2017), the 
European Parliament elections in May 2014 was a watershed event for this 
rise. Although, many like Mudde6 and Mudde (2016), disagree with the 
significant of the 2014 European Parliament elections. Yet we use the day 
after the 2014 European Parliament elections, 26 May 2014, as the start date 
of our observation. 
Furthermore, the continued impact of the Brexit vote on the Eurozone 
equity markets as the UK and EU struggle to get a workable agreement that 
would suit both sides and more importantly get approval from both 
parliaments. According to Hobolt (2016), in the wake of the 23 June 2016 
Brexit vote global equity markets loss over two trillion dollars. The reaction 
on 24th June 2016 of the Eurozone equity markets illustrated the shock wave 
to the Brexit vote as shown by Figure 2. With the exception of Finland, the 
losses were greater than 5% meaning an average of 8.17% across all 12 
observed Eurozone equity markets. With the current draft agreement7 in 
the balance, the continued disfunction at the heart of the British 
government look likely to negatively impact on the global and hence the 
Eurozone equity markets in the short run. 
Moreover, an additional impact on the integration of the Eurozone came 
on 1st October 2017 when Catalonia held a referendum on independence 
from Spain as highlighted by Cetra & Lineira (2018). According to Cetra & 
Lineira (2018), the turnout was only 43% resulting in a 90.2% vote for 
independence against 7.8%. The Spanish government declared the 
referendum illegal. However, as stated by Cetra & Lineira (2018), this was 
not the only bid for independence within the European Union, in 2014 the 
UK government agreed a referendum on Scottish independence.  The 
turnout was 99.91% resulting in a 55.3% win for the unionists. However, as 
argued by Cetra & Lineira (2018), with the Brexit results many in Scotland 
feel there is a need to hold a new referendum. Furthermore, according to 
Cetra & Lineira (2018), there are other regions within the EU and in 
particular the Eurozone who are calling for independence. 
 
6  In an article to the Washington Post on 30/05/2014 titled “The far right in the 2014 
European Elections: of earthquakes, cartels and designer fascists.” 
7 The draft agreement document number TF50 (2018) 55 agreed on 14 November 2018. the 
agreement could be accessed on [Retrieved from].  
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Figure 2. Impact of Brexit Vote on the Eurozone Equity Markets on 24 June 2016 
 
Table 7 seem to be hinting at news from the EuroStoxx effecting seven 
markets during this period with the exception of the ATX, BEL, ATHEX 
and AEX, all the markets were effected. However, the news from only two 
markets, BEL and AEX, did have an impact on the EuroStoxx. Thus 
resulting in ratios of 7:4 and 2:9 respectively.  
With the exception of four markets: ATX, BEL, OMXH and AEX; there 
was a volatility spillover effect between the EuroStoxx and Eurozone 
markets hinting at a ratio of 7:4. However, the transmission of volatility 
between the Eurozone markets and EuroStoxx impacted five markets: BEL, 
OMXH, CAC, ATHEX and AEX. Hence, the ratio was 5:6. 
The statistics indicate a ratio of 7:4 effected by negative news from the 
EuroStoxx with the exceptions being the ATX, OMXH, ATHEX and PSI. 
With the exception of three Eurozone markets: OMXH, MIB and AEX; the 
EuroStoxx was effected by the transmission of negative news which gives a 
ratio of 8:3. 
The stability status of the transmission between the EuroStoxx and 
Eurozone markets seem to be hinting at a ratio of 7:4 with seven markets 
being volatile: ATX, BEL, OMXH, CAC, DAX, MIB and AEX. Conversely, 
the stability status of the transmission from the Eurozone markets to 
EuroStoxx is hinting at a ratio of 6:5 with the ATX, BEL, OMXH, CAC, 
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Table 7. Stability Test for the Rise of Populist Movement Period (26/05/2014-31/12/2018) 
Market ATX BEL 20 OMX H 25 CAC 40 DAX ATHEX LC ISEQ Overall MIB AEX PSI 20 IBEX 35 
Distribution Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal 
Mean Statistics 
µEuro 
4.1771E-02 3.3660E-02 4.2091E-02 2.4358E-02 3.4035E-02 3.8468E-02 4.2687E-02 4.4956E-02 3.2119E-02 4.1652E-02 4.2365E-02 
(2.336E-03) (2.115E-03) (2.471E-03) (2.513E-03) (2.669E-03) (2.549E-03) (2.965E-03) (1.970E-03) (2.252E-03) (2.425E-03) (2.239E-03) 
µi 
2.5922E-02 2.6019E-02 4.8286E-02 4.6757E-02 4.4106E-01 2.9950E-03 1.4756E-01 2.6007E+00 4.7916E-04 6.3112E-02 4.4258E-01 
(1.303E-03) (1.539E-03) (2.492E-03) (4.438E-03) (2.811E-02) (1.485E-04) (6.979E-03) (9.871E-02) (3.508E-05) (2.745E-04) (2.167E-02) 
Off Diagonal Co-Variance Statistics 
AEuro, i 
6.5956E-02 7.4354E-02 2.5277E-01 4.6829E-01 -1.3120E-01 1.4008E-02 2.4249E-01 3.7100E+00 6.3213E-04 1.3655E-01 2.2454E+00 
(1.296E-02) (2.989E-02) (2.878E-02) (1.339E-01) (5.078E-01) (2.074E-02) (6.206E-02) (1.605E+00) (7.406E-04) (4.740E-02) (3.840E-01) 
Ai, Euro 
7.0825E-02 2.2526E-01 -7.6780E-04 5.5285E-02 1.7186E-02 3.0693E-02 3.4760E-02 1.3161E-03 8.5865E+00 2.2882E-02 3.2391E-03 
(2.831E-02) (4.011E-02) (2.234E-02) (2.971E-02) (4.306E-03) (8.795E-03) (8.269E-03) (4.971E-04) (2.663E+00) (4.679E-03) (3.452E-03) 
BEuro, i 
-9.8366E-02 9.6478E-02 -1.5693E-02 1.8777E+00 -6.7737E+00 -5.8065E-01 2.8419E-01 1.5017E+01 6.5862E-03 -3.1323E-01 -2.1523E+00 
(1.447E-02) (5.499E-02) (5.529E-02) (2.663E-01) (5.657E-01) (3.171E-02) (7.833E-02) (3.471E+00) (1.026E-03) (6.020E-02) (5.787E-01) 
Bi, Euro 
-6.3768E-02 -2.2701E-01 -2.7863E-01 -3.9242E-01 3.6006E-02 2.0875E-01 -9.7483E-03 -3.8105E-03 -1.8047E+01 2.3561E-02 2.4226E-03 
(3.200E-02) (8.698E-02) (4.425E-02) (6.335E-02) (4.649E-03) (1.331E-02) (1.236E-02) (1.085E-03) (3.638E+00) (6.853E-03) (4.240E-03) 
DEuro, i 2.0374E-01
 -2.4470E-06 1.8480E-06 -2.9151E-05 -1.2676E-04 3.5310E-02 -6.2155E-02 -9.4102E+01 -9.0000E-08 1.0238E+00 -4.0354E-05 
(1.724E-01) (2.238E-01) (2.996E-01) (8.773E-01) (4.723E+00) (1.635E-01) (6.667E-01) (1.271E+01) (4.641E-03) (5.597E-01) (2.363E+00) 
Di, Euro 
-8.8674E-01 -2.2260E-06 2.2700E-07 -1.0818E-05 -1.1050E-06 -3.9788E+00 -2.5844E-01 3.6774E-02 1.5700E-06 -4.8491E-02 -5.5900E-07 
(5.766E-01) (4.216E-01) (1.862E-01) (2.247E-01) (3.752E-02) (6.380E+00) (7.726E-02) (4.498E-03) (2.084E+01) (1.372E-01) (3.029E-02) 
Model Statistics 
Log-Likelihood  3,268.6108 3,351.5086 2,640.4200 3,063.0282 503.8979 1,736.1457 1,282.4553 -1,796.3557 8,207.2039 1,236.5167 304.3198 
Final Criterion 7.50E-06 0.00E+00 5.20E-06 7.30E-06 5.00E-07 8.80E-06 2.70E-06 3.70E-06 0.00E+00 3.90E-06 7.10E-06 
Co-integration Volatility Test 
σ2Euro 0.208121           
σ2Market 0.118393 0.197020 0.184744 0.401641 1.976284 0.684980 1.194872 11.891184 0.003519 0.751496 2.286339 
Stability Test (MarketEuro→Marketi) 
Statistics 2.9548 2.3091 2.1999 2.3877 3.6968 1.8079 0.3946 6.3365 5.9958 0.1674 0.3704 
 Status Volatile Volatile Volatile Volatile Volatile Stable Stable Volatile Volatile Stable Stable 
Stability Test (MarketEuro←Marketi) 
Statistics 6.7023 2.7898 3.6891 2.3721 0.4428 5.5952 0.9090 0.0801 63.1730 1.0969 0.4061 
Status Volatile Volatile Volatile Volatile Stable Volatile Stable Stable Volatile Stable Stable 
 
6. Summary of the results  
It is worth noting that theoretically in econometrics a fully integrated 
market news affecting one segment would affect all segments and hence 
the magnitude of the volatility spillover effect would be similar thru all 
segmentsas hinted by Baele (2005) and Bekaert et al., (2002). In reality the 
markets do react differently to news depending on the affinity of the 
market’s participants to the event. In a market, such as the Eurozone, 
where there is a number of diverse factors influencing the behaviour of 
market participants in each segment; the reaction to news and thus 
magnitude of the volatility spillover effect is likely to differ between 
segments and thru time. The truth is that the impact of any event is 
connected to “time and space” and hence the gravitational pull of the 
reaction is determined by the close affiliation of the market participants to 
the event at any given time. 
In analysing the complete picture, you get the impression the interaction 
between Eurozone equity markets is governed by the underlining context 
as illustrated by Table 8. Simply put, this means that the market 
environment is key to financial integration, hence market participants 
reaction to general market environmental factors determine the level and 
stability of the financial market integration. Furthermore, these 
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environmental factors are influenced by the “time and space” effect. In 
essence, this means that market participants react differently to any news 
or event at any time given the market. 
 















Euro → Market 















Euro → Market 















Euro → Market 














Euro → Market 














As illustrated by Table 8, the behaviour of market participants varies 
depending on the market and event in time. Hence the general differences 
and similarities in reacting to varying events which is illustrated by the 
period of high uncertainties during the later part of the observation. There 
are several similarities and yet several differences in the reactions to the 
events during the financial and sovereign debt crises and populist 
movements period.  
The funny thing is thateven though the Eurozone financial markets may 
react differently; yet in the overall scheme of things the evidence from the 
literature is that of integration, especially during the euro introductory and 
bull market periods. In truth the Eurozone equity markets were never truly 
integrated as dictated by the econometrics theories earlier in this section 
and illustrated by Table 8. However, this does not mean that the markets 
were never integrated in accordance to the definition of Baele et al., (2004). 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we extended the volatility test to analyse the stability 
status of the integration of the Eurozone equity markets in the aftermath of 
the Euro by introducing a multivariate volatility test. The underlining 
model was a bivariate asymmetrical BEKK GARCH, allowing us to analyse 
the volatility spillover, news contagion effect and stability of the market 
environment during six different periods with differing impacts. 
Surprisingly, our findings seem to be hinting at generally news and 
volatility seem to travel from the Eurozone to the sovereign equity market. 
Conversely, the results of our stable market pre-condition hypothesis seem 
to suggest generally with the exception of two observed periods, the 
underlining market environment is stable. Unsurprisingly the two 
exceptions occur when the markets either massively underreact as in the 
case of the bull market period or massively overreact as in the sovereign 
debt crisis within the Eurozone. 
Our empirical results point to differences in the reaction of market 
participants which hints at the “time and space” effect. This seem to be 
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suggesting that the Eurozone equity markets were never truly integrated in 
the sense of the econometrics definition. However, this does not mean that 
the Eurozone equity markets were not integrated in accordance with the 
definition of Baele et al. (2004). What is without doubt is the reactions of 
market participants depends on two factors: the time and market of the 
eventas illustrated earlier, hence the “time and space” effect. This is what 
drives the Eurozone equity market’s integration, especially during highly 
volatile and uncertain times. 
A relevant factor raised by our empirical evidence regarding the stability 
of some markets during highly volatile periods is they seem to be defying 
conventional wisdom by being stable, in particular the Greek market 
during the sovereign debt crisis. As hinted by Fakhry (2016b), a possible 
explanation could be found in the underreaction / overreaction hypothesis 
which suggests that market participants’ reaction leads to overvaluation or 
undervaluation during any period. Hence, a highly volatile period with 
instances of both under reaction and overreaction could give the 
impression of a stable market. This is what seems to have happened during 
these periods as market participants reacted to the information and news. 
We also reviewed the literature on the integration of the Eurozone 
equity markets in the aftermath of the introduction of the Euro. We found 
most of the past empirical and literature pointed to an acceleration of the 
integration in the aftermath of the euro’s introduction and during the bull 
market. However, this was slowed down in the aftermath of both crises; 
although, the literature does point to the sovereign debt crisis having a 
bigger impact than the financial crisis. Nevertheless, the real danger is in 
the rise of the populist and nationalist movements across Europe which 
depending on the views could result in the disintegration of the EU and 
thus the Eurozone. The case of Brexit and the resulting deal will no doubt 
be watched carefully with the potential of others to follow suit, there are 
already signs that the Italians want out.  
A relevant factor to emerge from the Brexit and 2014 European Union 
parliamentary elections is that many people don’t fully understand the 
workings and fundamental concept of the European Union. Hence, many 
on the opposing view are able to significantly highlight the weaknesses of 
the European Union. This points to a lack of communication by the 
European Union parliament. We therefore advise the European Union 
parliament to communicate more with the population in order to raise the 
awareness of the work and concept of the European Union. Another issue 
raised was the loss of a sense of national identity, therefore pushing a 
significant number to extreme nationalist. Although, I am a supporter of 
European integration; however, a policy of slower paced integration would 
be of benefit to most considering the rise in nationalist views within the 
European Union and Eurozone. A key issue raised by the recent crises is 
the miscommunication and disjointed actions by key politicians which 
resulted in the financial markets being highly volatile and over reactive. We 
recommend the setup of a committee to oversee the communication and 
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actions, especially during any future crisis, which would help to stabilize 
the Eurozone financial markets and therefore lead to a more integrated 
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